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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

UNION RIGHTS, NO DUES: IN RE EPILEPSY FOUNDATION AND
THE NLRB’S EXTENSION OF WEINGARTEN RIGHTS TO
NONUNION EMPLOYEES

Consider the following scenario: a nonunion employee is accused of
pushing his supervisor after a heated exchange. The only parties present
during the dispute are the supervisor, the accused and a coworker-witness of
the accused. Both employees are known to be extremely hostile toward their
supervisor because of recent departmental changes. To avoid collusion
between the two friends, upper management wishes to interview each
employee individually to ascertain the facts surrounding the incident. The
accused refuses to meet with upper management alone and requests the
presence of the coworker-witness at the meeting. When the accused continues
to refuse meetings with upper management, he is discharged for gross
insubordination.
Until the recent decision by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board) in In re Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio,1 the company would
have been on solid ground in refusing the employee’s request. The Board’s
holding in Epilepsy Foundation now requires an employer to grant a nonunion
employee’s request for a coworker’s presence at investigatory meetings where
the employee reasonably believes that discipline may result.2
Few employee relations professionals in a union-free environment realize
the protections of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) extend to
nonunion employees. For the past fifteen years, these protections have been
almost exclusively in the area of union organizations.3 The seed for extending
1. In re Epilepsy Foundation, Nos. 8-CA-28169 and 8-CA-28264, 2000 WL 967066
(N.L.R.B. Jul. 10, 2000).
2. Id.
3. This is not surprising considering the wording of the Act. The preamble of the Act
states:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). See also John D. Canoni, Non-Union Employees Are Entitled To Have A
Coworker Present At Investigatory Interviews, at http://www.lawmemo.com/emp/articles/
nonunion.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2000).
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these protections to nonunion employees was planted in the Supreme Court’s
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc. decision.4 There, the Court held that an
employee’s request to have a union representative present during an interview
must be granted if the employee reasonably believes the meeting will result in
the imposition of discipline.5 Basing its decision on Section 7 of the Act,
which guarantees employees the right to “engage in concerted activity for the
purpose of . . . mutual aid and protection,”6 the Court noted that “Weingarten
rights” would help to level the playing field between employers and
employees.7 To hold otherwise, the Court noted, would be a direct
contradiction of the purpose of the NLRA.8
This Note will examine the rationale of previous Boards and the current
Board in their interpretation and application of Weingarten rights in a
nonunion setting. Part I focuses on pre-Weingarten decisions by the Board,
outlines the provisions of the NLRA that are relevant to this Note and
discusses the congressional intent surrounding those provisions. Part II details
the Court’s decision in Weingarten and the establishment of Weingarten rights.
This section also examines the pivotal Board rulings after Weingarten,
interpreting these rights as they pertain to nonunion employees. Part III
analyzes the Board’s decision in Epilepsy Foundation. Included in this section
will be an examination of Members Bremer and Hurtgen’s persuasive
dissenting opinions. Part IV concludes that although a permissible
interpretation of the Court’s decision in Weingarten, the majority’s holding in
Epilepsy Foundation is not the most desirable. The Board’s determination that
nonunion employees have an unfettered right to have another employee present
during an investigatory interview imposes upon the employer the duty to deal
with nonunion employees as a collective unit, a result not supported by the
NLRA.
I. PRE-WEINGARTEN
The Board has by no means been consistent in its interpretation of the
NLRA with regards to union representation at investigatory meetings. The
Board’s first interpretation occurred in 1945 in Ross Gear & Tool Co.9 Ross
Gear involved a dispute between female nonunion, nonsmoking employees
and their female union counterparts who had recently been given permission to
4. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
5. Id. at 267.
6. Section 7 provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
7. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262.
8. Id.
9. 63 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1945).
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smoke on the shop floor like their male coworkers.10 The female advocate of
the extension of the smoking policy to females also served as recording
secretary for the union.11 As a result of her championing the smoking policy
change, numerous altercations erupted between her and her nonunion
coworkers.12 Management and the union bargaining committee met with the
employee and discussed the problems that were occurring on the shop floor.13
The employee, fearful that she was going to be terminated, requested union
representation at the meeting.14 The employer refused and subsequently
informed the employee that she would be terminated if she would not meet
with him alone. The employee again refused to meet without union
representation and was discharged for insubordination.15
The Board, while not deciding the specific issue of union representation at
a disciplinary meeting, nonetheless held that the employer’s actions in refusing
to deal with the union violated the employee’s rights guaranteed under Section
7 of the Act.16 The Seventh Circuit refused to enforce the Board’s order.17
The court disagreed with the Board’s finding that the employee had been
discharged for anything other than insubordination for refusing to attend a
meeting with her supervisor without the presence of the entire bargaining
committee.18 The court then went on to emphasize that the meeting between
the employee and the company was merely investigatory and that no grievance
had at that time been filed.19 That being the case, the court determined that the
employer’s refusal in no way restrained or interfered with the employee’s
Section 7 rights.20 Thus, under the court’s analysis, the only meetings that
would mandate union representation were those meetings held to discuss a
formal grievance.21
The Board did not deal with the issue of union representation at
disciplinary meetings until some twenty years later in Dobbs House, Inc.22
This case involved the termination of an employee several job infractions after

10. Id. at 1022.
11. Id. at 1021-22.
12. Id. at 1023.
13. Id. This meeting was actually called in order to attempt to bargain a new labor
agreement. The problems with the smoking policy were discussed at this meeting. Id.
14. 63 N.L.R.B. at 1025.
15. Id. at 1028.
16. Id. at 1034.
17. 158 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1947).
18. Id. at 613.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 145 N.L.R.B. 1565 (1964).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1312

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1309

being previously disciplined on numerous occasions.23 The employee
requested and was denied union representation when discussing the allegations
with her supervisor.24 The Board, in affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s
(ALJ’s) findings that the employee was not entitled to union representation,
stated that nothing in the Act obliges the company to grant an employee’s
request for union representation in every situation where an employee is
subject to discipline.25 The Board stated that this was especially true in the
situation at hand because the conduct for which the employee was disciplined
was not related to any protected union activity.26
The Board changed course three years later in Texaco, Houston Producing
Division.27 This case again presented an employee who was refused union
representation at an interview held by the company to investigate an alleged
theft by the employee.28 The Board distinguished its decision in Texaco,
weighing that the employer was not merely investigating the incident, but
meeting to get information already adduced “on record” in the event that
discipline was imposed.29 Under these circumstances, the Board reasoned that
the employer clearly intended to deal directly with the employee concerning
his terms and conditions of employment.30 As such, the Board found the
employer’s denial of the request that a union representative be present at the
meeting concerning the suspension interfered with the employee’s rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. The Board held that the company had
violated Sections 8(a)(1)31 and 8(a)(5)32 of the Act by its refusal to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees.33

23. Id. at 1569. The case provides no information concerning the reason for the disciplinary
actions taken against the employee.
24. Id. at 1570-71
25. Id. at 1571. The court stated, “An employer undoubtedly has the right to maintain
day-to-day discipline in the plant or on the working premises and it seems to me that only
exceptional circumstances should warrant any interference with this right.”
26. Id.
27. 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967).
28. Id. at 361.
29. Id. at 362.
30. Id.
31. When an employer commits an unfair labor practice, it violates Section 8(a). Section
8(a)(1) prohibits an employer from interfering with the exercise of rights by employees which are
guaranteed under Section 7. This provision is very broad and encompasses all Section 8
violations. Thus, whenever there is a violation of Sections 8(a)(2), (3), (4) or (5), a violation of
Section 8(a)(1) is also committed. Section 8(b)(1) declares it an unfair labor practice “to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in” Section 7 of the
Act. See supra note 6. A Section 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice is committed when an employer
discriminates against employees regarding terms and conditions of employment in order to
encourage or discourage union membership. Likewise, Section 8(a)(4) prohibits discrimination
against an employee for filing a charge with the N.L.R.B. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994).
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The Board’s decision was based primarily on its finding that the
employer’s purpose in meeting with the employee was to complete its case
against the employee to justify disciplinary action.34 The Board’s finding of an
8(a)(5) violation was grounded in this factual determination. It reasoned that
the employer’s intent in calling such a meeting was to deal directly with the
employee concerning terms and conditions of his employment. Hence, the
company’s refusal to deal with the employee’s selected union representative
concerning his terms and conditions of employment was clearly a refusal to
bargain collectively.35
The Fifth Circuit reversed the Board’s decision in Texaco.36 While the
court relied primarily on a different interpretation of the facts, it also based its
decision, in part, on a finding that whether a meeting requires the company to
grant an employee’s request for representation is determined by the purpose of
the meeting.37 The Fifth Circuit’s decision differentiated between meetings
with employees to investigate the employees misconduct and those meetings
with the sole purpose of administering discipline.38
The court’s reliance on the underlying purpose of the meeting as governing
whether union representation requests must be granted was supported by two
earlier Board decisions: Chevron Oil Co.39 and Jacobe-Pearson Ford.40 In
Chevron Oil, the Board upheld the trial examiner’s determination that the right
to union representation at an employer-employee meeting did not arise until
two things occured: (1) a management decision was made that would
somehow adversely impact an employee’s terms and conditions of
employment; and (2) the management decision must be on the verge of
implementation.41 Finding that neither event had occurred, the Board held the

32. Section 8(a)(5) which makes it illegal for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively
with representatives selected by the majority of employees over terms and conditions of
employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994).
33. Texaco, 168 N.L.R.B. at 362.
34. Id.
35. Id. The Board stated that management’s refusal to deal with the union in this instance
“transgressed its statutory obligation to bargain with the union concerning the terms and
conditions of employment it represents.” As such, the Board found the employer’s refusal of
representation to be violative of Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5).
36. 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969).
37. Id. at 144. The court’s ruling upheld the Board’s determination that an employer is not
required to provide union representation for all dealings with employees that may ultimately
affect terms and conditions of employment. Id.
38. Id. “[S]ince the interview dealt only with eliciting facts and not with the consequences
of the facts revealed, its subject matter was not within the scope of compulsory collective
bargaining.” Id. at 145.
39. 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967).
40. 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968).
41. Chevron Oil, 168 N.L.R.B. at 578.
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employer did not violate the Act when it met with the employee without a
union representative.42
In Jacobe-Pearson Ford, the Board found that a meeting scheduled with
an employee to discuss a potential insubordination incident was merely to elicit
the employee’s side of the story and did not require the employer to submit to
the employee’s request for union representation.43 The Board found that the
company had made no decision to discipline the employee at the time of the
investigatory meeting and had promised the union that it would explain any
determinations made as a result of information obtained at the meeting with the
employee.44 Echoing its decision in Chevron Oil, the Board stated, “in view of
the absence of any definite adverse action taken . . . and [the company’s]
willingness to explain and bargain with the union any disciplinary decision
made, [the company] did not breach any statutory obligation in denying union
representation . . . at the fact-finding meeting.”45
II. THE MODERN DOCTRINE
Following the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Texaco and the Board’s decisions in
Chevron Oil and Jacobe-Pearson, it appeared that the right to union
42. Id. at 579. Chevron Oil had a bifurcated review system. When an issue arose that was
deemed to warrant discipline, a fact-finding meeting was scheduled with the employee whose
alleged misconduct was at issue. The employee was told that he was not obligated to say
anything at the meeting but it was understood that if the employee failed to explain his conduct
that management was free to rely solely on the facts relayed by the foreman reporting the
incident. The employee was also told that the purpose of the meeting was to gather information
to enable management to make a determination as to whether discipline was appropriate. The
management personnel in attendance at the fact-finding meetings had no authority to administer
discipline. As such, union representation was not necessary at this step of the process.
Once the company reached the decision to take disciplinary action, the company
scheduled a disciplinary meeting with the employee and his union representative. The company
would lay out its case for the employee and the representative. Anyone in attendance at this
meeting could comment, attempt to clarify or modify any facts relating to the case at hand. If
persuaded by the union’s arguments the company could forego punishment entirely or if
unconvinced could proceed as planned and mete out the discipline. Id. at 577.
43. Jacobe-Pearson, 172 N.L.R.B. at 594-95. An employee in the automotive shop was
found to have turned away an end-of-day job that would have potentially required the employee
to remain at work past his quitting time. Instead, the employee left work fifteen-minutes early.
The next day the employee came to work and found his timecard pulled. The employee testified
that because of the pulled time card he feared that he was being discharged. As such, when
management requested to meet with him to discuss the previous day’s incident the employee
asked that a union representative be present. The request was denied. Id.
44. Id. at 595.
45. Id. As the trial examiner pointed out, however, the true intent of the company in
requesting the meeting is factually unknown. The meeting with the employee never took place
and thus the question of “whether or not the proposed interview with [the employee] was an effort
to deal with him concerning the terms and conditions of employment can never be established
with any certainty.” Id. at 599.
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representation at employer interviews hinged upon the narrow distinction
between investigatory and disciplinary interviews.46 This standard led some
commentators to the conclusion that the Board’s distinction was illusory at
best.47
A.

An Evolving Standard

The trial examiner in Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminal, finding the
Board’s new standard unworkable, developed a new test for determining an
employee’s rights to union representation.48 He proposed a test that shifted the
focus from the employer’s professed purpose for the meeting to the objective
manifestation of that purpose.49 In fashioning this new standard, the trial
examiner noted the Board’s recent use of an “either/or” classification system
was flawed in that many situations would not fall into either category.50 He
proposed, and the Board endorsed, an objective test where the “statutory
rights . . . vest or materialize when management’s course of conduct . . .
provides objective manifestations sufficient reasonably to justify the
conclusion that a disciplinary reaction . . . will be forthcoming.”51
Three years after Los Angeles Sales Terminal, Mobile Oil Corp. came
before the Board.52 Mobile Oil involved five employees who were suspected
46. See David L. Gregory, The Employee’s Right To Representation During Employer
Investigatory Interviews: A Critical Analysis Of The Evolution Of Weingarten Principles, 28
VILL. L. REV. 572, 581 (1983); Theodore C. Hirt, Union Presence In Disciplinary Meetings, 41
U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 332 (1973). The Board’s distinction between investigatory and disciplinary
meeting is ambiguous. Since the employer had not yet determined that discipline was
appropriate, the meeting was necessarily investigatory. This subjective test will require a caseby-case review and will rely on the “behavior and intent of the employer, with conjectural
inferences from ambiguous actions.” Hirt, supra, at 332. It may also be surmised that the
Board’s attempt to limit an employee’s right to representation to only disciplinary meetings
demonstrates the Board’s concern that to hold otherwise would allow representation in all run-ofthe-mill meetings thus potentially disrupting the employer’s operations. Id.; see also Joan
Torzewski, Employee Right To Union Representation During Employer Interrogations, 7 U. TOL.
L. REV. 298, 305-06 (1975) (noting that the Board’s lack of a definitive standard leaves
employees in a quandary in that they could never be certain that their assessment of the likelihood
of discipline would be accepted).
47. See Torzewski, supra note 46, at 306-07. The Board’s distinction was in many ways not
meaningful in that the Board, in many cases, was turning a blind eye to the fact that many times
the employer already had all the information needed for a disciplinary decision. As such, the
interview was being conducted merely to confirm these facts. The Board also seemed
uninterested in the fact that, although the employee was granted union representation in the
disciplinary meeting, the employee was usually denied the benefits of a de novo meeting. Id. at
307.
48. Los Angeles Sales Terminal, 179 N.L.R.B. 976 (1969).
49. Id. at 983; see also Gregory, supra note 46, at 582.
50. Los Angeles Sales Terminal, 179 N.L.R.B. at 982-83.
51. Id. at 983.
52. 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972).
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of stealing company property.53 The employees were interviewed by the
company’s security agents without benefit of union representation. Based on
information gleaned from these interviews, the employees were discharged.54
The trial examiner found that the employer’s refusal of union
representation did not violate the Act because the interviews were not being
conducted to support a predetermined disciplinary action.55 As such, the trial
examiner concluded that there could be no violation of sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(5) of the Act.56
The examiner’s reliance on the Chevron Oil and Jacobe-Pearson
distinction between investigatory and disciplinary interviews was rejected by
the Board. It concluded that an employer’s refusal of an employee’s request to
union representation when the employee reasonably believes that information
solicited at the interview could have an adverse affect on his employment
violates that Act.57 An employee’s request in such situations is premised on
Section 7 of the Act which guarantees the right of employees to act in concert
for mutual aid and protection.58 Consequently, an employer who violates an
employee’s Section 7 right by refusing to provide union representation also
violates sections 8(a)(1) of the Act.59
The Board did not, however, find a violation of 8(a)(5) as in the past.60
The Board had previously held that under Section 8(a)(5), management had a
duty to bargain with the union regarding disciplinary matters because such
discussions implicated terms and conditions of employment.61 Thus, the
Board’s refusal to find a violation of Section 8(a)(5) essentially eliminated the
need to differentiate between investigatory and disciplinary meetings.62
The Seventh Circuit refused to enforce the Board’s decision in Mobil Oil.63
The court found the type of activity complained of, union representation at
investigatory meetings, was not intended to be covered by Section 7.64 The

53. Id. at 1059. The five employees consisted of four bargaining unit employees and one
supervisor. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1060.
56. Id.
57. Mobil Oil, 196 N.L.R.B. at 1052. In so finding, the Board found that the four employees
knew they were suspected of theft and it was therefore a reasonable assumption that the
company’s interviews could possibly lead to their termination. Id.
58. Id.
59. See supra note 31.
60. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 27-35 and 39-45.
62. Gregory, supra note 46, at 585.
63. Mobil Oil Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973).
64. Id. at 847. “A fair interpretation of the broad purpose and language of Section 7
persuades us that the novel ‘right to representation’ recognized by the Board in this case is not a
‘concerted activity’ within the meaning of the Act.” Id.
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protections intended by Section 7 of the Act were only intended to “enable
employees to organize and to apply economic pressure against their employers
in appropriate situations.”65
B.

The Supreme Court’s Endorsement of a New Standard

In International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. Quality
Manufacturing Co.66 and N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten,67 the Supreme Court was
presented with the issue of whether an employer’s discharge of an employee
for refusing to meet alone with the employer violated the Act. The Court
addressed and endorsed the test first set forth by the trial examiner in Los
Angeles Sales Terminal.68
1.

Quality Manufacturing Co.

In Quality Manufacturing,69 an employee requested her union
representative be present in a meeting with her employer to discuss a work
stoppage she had instigated in protest of the employer’s piece-rate wage
system. After the employee refused to meet alone with the employer on
numerous occasions, the employee was terminated.70
The Board began by distinguishing the issue presented in Quality
Manufacturing from that of previously decided cases.71 It noted that Quality
Manufacturing represented the first case in which an employee had been
discharged for insisting on union representation at an employer investigatory
interview.72 Further, the Board had never considered the Section 7 rights of
individual employees to act in concert “for mutual aid and protection.”73
The Board struck a balance between the employee’s rights and the rights of
the employers. Where an employee reasonably believes that the interview will
have an adverse effect on his employment, participation in the interview is

65. Id. at 846-47. The court stated that had Congress intended Section 7 protections to
extend to employees who fear reprisal from an employer meeting, that interpretation would have
been recognized long ago. Id. at 848.
66. 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
67. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
68. See supra notes 49-51.
69. 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972).
70. Id. at 197-98.
71. Id. at 198. See also Gregory, supra note 46, at 587 n.104 (noting that while the Board
was correct in distinguishing the Board’s previous decisions, it failed to address Ross Gear, a
case in which the factual situation was the same). See Ross Gear, 63 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1945).
72. Quality Mfg., 195 N.L.R.B. at 198.
73. Id.
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voluntary, unless a union representative is permitted to be present.74 Where
not permitted, the employee may opt to forego the interview entirely.75
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the Board’s decision and refused
enforcement.76 In particular, the court took exception to the Board’s view that
this case was one of first impression.77 The court noted that the Board had
addressed the issue of Section 8(a)(1) in the context of the denial of
representation at an employer-instigated interview,78 stating “[b]y necessary
implication, Section 7 rights have been at issue in each of these cases.”79
Nowhere in the litany of cases did the Board find that Section 7 mandates
union representation in investigatory interviews where the employee fears his
job might be in jeopardy.
Moreover, the circuit court found no legal support for the Board’s
conclusions.80 The court pointed out that the Board’s purpose is to determine
whether the Act has been violated.81 Since the Board had never held this to be
a violation in the past, the court saw no reason to hold it as one in this case.82
2.

N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten

Weingarten came before the Board while the Fourth Circuit was
considering Quality Manufacturing.83 In Weingarten, an employee suspected
of theft was interrogated by her supervisor and store security.84 Several times
during the interview the employee requested, and was subseqently denied,
union representation.85
The trial examiner relied on the Board’s decisions in Mobil Oil and Quality
Manufacturing to hold that Section 8(a)(1) of the Act had been violated.86 In so
determining, the trial examiner found the only real question that required

74. Id.
75. Id. at 199. As there can be no reasonable basis for the fear of adverse impact, the Board
clarified that such protections are not intended to extend to “run-of-the-mill shop floor
conversation.” Id.
76. 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973).
77. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
78. Id. at 1024. See also Ross Gear, 63 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1945); Dobbs House, 145 N.L.R.B.
1565 (1964); Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Div., 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967).
79. Quality Mfg., 195 N.L.R.B. at 1024.
80. In providing no statutory analysis the Board simply concluded, “[t]his seems to us to be
the proper rule where, as here, the interview, whether or not purely investigative, concerns a
subject matter related to disciplinary offenses.” Id. at 1025.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 202 N.L.R.B. 446 (1973).
84. Id. at 448. The facts of Weingarten differed from Quality Manufacturing in that the
employer did not discharge the employee. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
85. Weingarten, 202 N.L.R.B. at 448.
86. Id. at 449.
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answering was whether the employee had a reasonable belief that her job was
in danger.87 Under the standard set forth in Quality Manufacturing, the trial
examiner found the test easily met.88
The Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board’s order.89 Relying on
Board precedent and the decisions by the Fourth and Seventh Circuits in Mobil
Oil90 and Quality Manufacturing,91 the court fell back on the
investigatory/disciplinary differentiation and held the interview in Weingarten
to be merely investigatory;92 as such, no right to union representation
attached.93 Finally, the court flatly denied the Board’s attempt to distinguish
this case because none of the previous cases had dealt with an alleged violation
of Section 8(a)(1) in the context of union representation in employer-employee
interviews.94 The court noted the Fourth Circuit decision in Quality
Manufacturing which considered and rejected this contention.95
C. The Supreme Court’s Weingarten Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for Weingarten in 1974.96 It was in
this watershed case that the Supreme Court, in affirming the Board’s decision,
delineated what has come to be known as “Weingarten rights.” In its decision,
the Court began by summarizing the Board’s holdings in Quality
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten, 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973).
90. See supra note 63.
91. See supra note 76.
92. Weingarten, 485 F.2d at 1137. Concurring with its decision in Texaco Houston
Producing Division v. N.L.R.B., the court stated that since there was no evidence that the
employer sought to deal with the employee concerning her conditions of employment there was
no need for, or right to, union representation. Id.
93. Id. at 1138. Once the interview was deemed investigatory, the precedent is
overwhelming that there is no right to union representation at the interview. Id. at 1137.
94. Id. at 1137. The court concluded by stating that without some showing that the purpose
of the interview was not merely to gather information but to impose discipline action, no union
representation should be afforded. Id. at 1138.
95. Id. at 1137.
Every situation wherein an employee is directed by management to cooperate in an
investigatory interview carries the implicit threat of discipline if such direction is not
obeyed. And the statement that a particular Section 7 right [the right to act in concert for
mutual aid and protection] . . . had not been previously considered is inaccurate . . . .
[T]he Board has many times been confronted with an alleged violation of Section 8(a)(1)
in the context of a denial of union representation at employer-employee interviews. By
necessary implication, Section 7 rights have been at issue in each of these cases.
Id.
96. 420 U.S. 251 (1975). The Court also granted certiorari in Quality Manufacturing, 420
U.S. 276 (1975). The Court decided Weingarten and Quality Manufacturing jointly. The Quality
Mfg. Court held that its decision in Weingarten mandated a reversal of the Fourth Circuit’s
finding that no violation had occurred. Quality Mfg., 420 U.S. at 281.
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Manufacturing and Mobil Oil which set forth the limits of an employee’s
Section 7 rights.97
First, the Board in Mobil Oil found that an employee has a Section 7 right
to act in concert for mutual aid and protection.98 Second, an employee must
request representation if they so desire it.99 Third, an employee’s Section 7
right to representation at investigatory meetings applies only when the
employee reasonably believes the investigation will likely result in disciplinary
action.100 Fourth, the exercise of an employee’s rights may not interfere with
“legitimate employer prerogatives.”101 Finally, the employer is under no
obligation to bargain with the employee’s union representative during the
investigatory meeting.102
The Court stated that the Board’s holding in Weingarten was a permissible
construction of the Act that should have been upheld by the Fifth Circuit.103 It
noted that the goal of the NLRA is to protect a worker’s right to organize and
designate representatives for the purpose of mutual aid and protection.104 The
Board’s finding reinforced this goal by attempting to create a more level
playing field between the employer and employees. In doing so, the Court

97. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 256.
98. Id. “The denial of this right has a reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain, and
coerce employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Thus, it is a serious violation of the
employee’s individual right to engage in concerted activity by seeking the assistance of his
statutory representative if the employer denies the employee’s request and compels the employee
to appear unassisted at an interview which may put his job security in jeopardy.” Id. at 257.
99. Id. at 257. As such, the employee has the right to forego union representation and
continue with the interview unassisted. See also Appalachian Power Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 931
(1980) (holding that the employee, not the union, must request union representation in order for
Weingarten right to be affective); Kenneth L. Judd, The Weingarten Right In A Nonunion Setting:
A Permissible And Desirable Construction Of The National Labor Relations Act, 19 MEM. ST. L.
REV. 207, 211-12 (1989).
100. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257. The standard used to determine an employee’s ‘reasonable
belief’ is an objective standard that takes into consideration all the facts of the case. This
standard was set out in the Board’s decision in Quality Manufacturing, 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 198
n.3. See also Judd, supra note 99, at 212.
101. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257. The Court noted that the employer is not required to
justify his refusal to allow union representation at an investigatory meeting. Further, the Court
noted that the employer may continue with his investigation without the interview taking place.
Id. at 259. This places the employee in the precarious position of choosing between foregoing the
interview and the possible benefits thereof and submitting to the interview without representation.
Id.
102. Id. at 259. The representative is there to offer assistance in clearing up disputed or
missing facts and to offer alternatives suggestions for finding needed information. Id. at 260.
103. Id. at 261. The Court further stated that such a finding was not required by the Act, but
that it was clearly an acceptable interpretation. Id. at 266.
104. Id. at 261-62. See also Beth Ann Sabbath, The Right To Representation At Investigatory
Interviews After Weingarten, 7 J. CORP. L. 851, 856 (1989).
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found that to require an employee to confront his employer single-handedly
would “perpetuate the inequity the Act was designed to eliminate.”105
The presence of an employee’s union representative serves to protect not
only the individual employee, but also the interests of the entire bargaining
unit. Therefore, it benefits the bargaining unit as a whole to ensure that the
employer administers punishment in a just and fair manner.106 The Court
rejected the contention that representation prior to the filing of a formal
grievance is premature.107 Allowing representation only after discipline has
been imposed makes it difficult for the employee to defend himself because at
this stage of the process the employer is likely more concerned with justifying
its actions rather than listening to the employee’s justification.108 Indeed, the
Court recognized that a knowledgeable union representative could assist in the
investigatory process by eliciting pertinent facts thus allowing the employer to
“get to the bottom of the incident occasioning the interview.”109
The Court accepted the Board’s argument that although some if its
previous findings may have been contrary to its holding in Weingarten, those
previous findings should not forestall the Board from making decisions in
105. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262.
106. Id. at 260.
107. Id. at 263.
108. Id. at 264. The Court quoted from its opinion in Independent Lock Co.: “[Participation
by the union representative] might reasonably be designed to clarify the issues at this first stage of
the existence of a question, to bring out the facts and the policies concerned at this stage, to give
assistance to employees who may lack the ability to express themselves in their cases, and who,
when their livelihood is at stake, might in fact need the more experienced kind of counsel which
their union steward might represent. The foreman, himself, may benefit from the presence of the
steward by seeing the issue, the problem, the implications of the facts, and the collective
bargaining clause in question more clearly. Indeed, good faith discussion at this level may solve
many problems, and prevent needless hard feelings from arising . . . .” Id. (quoting Independent
Lock Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 744, 746 (1958)).
109. Id. While a union representative is permitted to take part in investigatory meetings with
the employer, there are several information-gathering incidents that do not always give rise to
Weingarten rights. See e.g., U.S. Postal Service, 252 N.L.R.B. 61 (1980) (stating that a company
mandated medical examination for an employee returning on recall after being off work more
than three months does not constitute “investigatory” for the purposes of Weingarten rights); E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 100 L.R.R.M. 1633 (Advice Memorandum 1981) (holding that a
search of an employee’s car, by itself, does not constitute an investigatory interview for purposes
of Weingarten rights); Walnut Hill Convalescent Home, 114 L.R.R.M. 1255 (Advice
Memorandum 1983) (finding that a handbag search, alone, does not rise to the level of an
investigatory interview for purposes of imposing Weingarten rights); TCC Ctr. Companies, 275
N.L.R.B. 604 (1985) (holding that an employee is only entitled to be represented by a union
representative thus the employee was precluded from being represented by an attorney at an
investigatory meeting). But see Consol. Casinos Corp., 266 N.L.R.B. 988 (1983) (holding that an
employee has the right to union representation during a polygraph test); Pacific Southwest
Airlines, 242 N.L.R.B. 1169 (1979) (finding that Weingarten rights apply to telephone
interviews).
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accordance with current trends.110 The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s
holding that the Board was bound by its own precedent, stating “to hold that
the Board’s earlier decisions froze the development of this important aspect of
the national labor law would misconceive the nature of administrative
decisionmaking.”111
The Court affirmed that it is the responsibility of the Board to respond to
changes between labor and management and adapt the Act to meet those
changes.112 As a result, any decision altering the field of labor-management
relations should be afforded limited judicial review. Finding that the circuit
court overstepped its authority, the Court held that the Board’s determination
that union representation at an employer-instigated interview was a plausible
interpretation of the Act and it was within the Board’s power to so hold.113
Justices Powell, Stewart, and Burger dissented in the Weingarten
opinion.114 Chief Justice Burger took issue with the Board’s apparent lack of
reasoning in overturning long-standing precedent,115 stating “[t]he tortured
history and inconsistency of the Board’s efforts in this difficult area suggest
the need for an explanation by the Board of why the new rule was adopted.”116
The Chief Justice explained that for an administrative agency to maintain its
integrity it must “disclose the basis of its order” and “give clear indications that
it has exercised the discretion with which Congress has empowered it.”117

110. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 265.
111. Id. at 265-66. “[T]he nature of the problem, as revealed by unfolding variant situations,
inevitably involves an evolutionary process for its rational response, not a quick, definitive
formula as a comprehensive answer. And so, it is not surprising that the Board has more or less
felt its way . . . and has modified and reformed its standards on the basis of accumulating
experience.” Id. (quoting Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B., 366 U.S. 667 (1961)). See also
Sabbath, supra note 104, at 855-56.
112. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266. The Board has the “special function of applying the
general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.” Id. (quoting Republic
Aviation, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945)).
113. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266. The Court did not address nonunion employees’ right to
assistance in investigatory meetings. See Steve Carlin, Extending Weingarten Rights to Nonunion
Employees, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 620 (1986) (noting that the Court’s silence is not surprising
since the Court stated that the Weingarten right should be examined through an “evolutionary
process,” responding to differing scenarios as they arise) (emphasis added).
114. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 269. Justice Burger’s dissent is filed separately. See N.L.R.B.
v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 268 (1975).
115. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 269.
116. Id. See also Gregory, supra note 46, at 593.
117. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 269 (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177,
197 (1941), and N.L.R.B. v. Metro. Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 443 (1965)). While conceding that
there may be very good reasons for overturning thirty years of precedent, Chief Justice Burger
would have remanded the case back to the Fourth Circuit with a directive to “enlighten us as to
the reasons for this marked change in policy.” Id.
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Justices Powell and Stewart saw the majority’s decision as an
encroachment on the bargaining process.118 “Congress’ goal in enacting
federal labor legislation was to create a framework within which labor and
management can establish the mutual rights and obligations that govern the
employment relationship. It was not this type of activity exercised by
individual employees that Congress sought to protect.”119
The right to discipline and discharge employees is a management right
barring specific statutory limitations or limitations set forth in a collective
bargaining agreement.120 As such, Justices Powell and Stewart found that
union representation at investigatory interviews should be a subject of
collective bargaining, not a Board mandate imposed under the guise of a
Section 7 right.121
Weingarten and the rights it delineated have been subject to a wide range
of interpretations. As is clearly demonstrated in the case history, Weingarten
left many questions unanswered, thus leading the Board to a myriad of
different interpretations.122
D. Post-Weingarten Interpretations
Cases following Weingarten addressed several different scenarios where
the Weingarten principles were to be applied.123 For the most part, the cases
have addressed only those employees represented by a union.124 The subject of

118. Id.
119. Id. at 272-73.
120. Id. at 273-74.
121. Id. at 275.
122. See Gregory, supra note 46, at 582. See also infra notes 294-297.
123. See Jill D. Flack, Limiting the Weingarten Right in the Nonunion Setting: The
Implications of Sears, Roebuck and Co., 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 1033, 1046 (1986). In Certified
Grocers, the Board found that Weingarten applies to both investigatory and disciplinary
interviews. 227 N.L.R.B. 1211, 1213-14 (1977), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 436 (9th Cir.
1978). The Board reversed part of its Certified Grocers decision in Baton Rouge Water Works
Co., where it held that an employee does not have a Section 7 right to representation at a meeting
strictly called to impose a predetermined discipline. 246 N.L.R.B. 995, 997 (1979). In Texaco,
the Board expanded on its decision in Baton Rouge to state that an employer’s offer to give an
employee the chance to explain their actions after the employer has imposed discipline did not
warrant Weingarten representation. 246 N.L.R.B. 1021, 1022 (1979).
124. See Flack, supra note 123, at 1047. See, e.g., Gulf States Mfg. v. N.L.R.B., 704 F.2d
1390 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that the employer violated an employee’s Weingarten rights when it
refused to allow union representation at a meeting held solely to impose discipline where a factfinding question was asked); N.L.R.B. v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that
an employer violated Weingarten by allowing union representation but not allowing the
representative to speak during the meeting); Lennox Indus. v. N.L.R.B., 637 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981) (finding a Weingarten violation where an employee was denied
representation when the person conducting the meeting had no knowledge of the employee’s
request, but the supervisor to whom the employee made the request was present at the meeting);
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representation in a nonunion setting was addressed only indirectly, with most
circuits finding that representation was appropriate.125
For instance, in ITT Lighting Fixtures v. NLRB,126 the Sixth Circuit found
that an employer’s denial of an employee’s request that a coworker be present
during an investigatory meeting violated Weingarten despite the fact that the
would-be representative could not have been a union representative due to the
fact that the union had not yet been certified.127 Likewise, in Anchortank v.
N.L.R.B., the Fifth Circuit held that an employee is entitled to Weingarten
representation regardless of the employer’s challenge of a recent certification
election.128
1.

Materials Research Corp.

In 1982, the Board first extended Weingarten rights in a nonunion setting
in Materials Research Corp.129 The ALJ found that the company had not
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it conducted an investigatory meeting
without allowing an employee representative to be present as requested by the
disciplined employee.130 The ALJ’s determination was premised on the fact
that the employees were not represented by a union.131 As such, the
Weingarten doctrine was not applicable.132

Good Hope Refineries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 620 F.2d 57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012
(1980) (holding that an employer violated the Act by denying an employee union representation
at a meeting to discuss an absenteeism issue).
125. Id. See e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co., 255 N.L.R. B. 14, 48-49 (1981), enforced without
opinion, 691 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that despite the employer’s refusal to recognize
the union, an employee is still entitled to representation at investigatory meetings).
126. 719 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1983).
127. Id. at 854.
128. 618 F.2d 1153, 1165 (5th Cir. 1980).
129. 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982). Employees in the precious metal department (“PDM”) of the
Materials Research Corp. were told by their supervisor that effective the following day they
would all be placed on new work schedules. Annoyed with the sudden change, one employee,
Hochman, attempted to arrange a meeting with management and a group of employees to express
their displeasure with the new schedule but was refused. After several attempts, Hochman was
told to come to his supervisor’s office. Hochman informed his supervisor that under federal law
he was entitled to have another employee present at any meeting that may lead to disciplinary
action. The supervisor responded that there was no such right and ordered Hochman to sit down
for the interview. At that time, Hochman was given a written reprimand for organizing the group
meeting. Hochman subsequently filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that Materials
Research had violated his rights by refusing to allow a coworker to be present during the meeting.
Id. at 1010-11.
130. Id. at 1025-27.
131. Id. at 1027.
132. Id.
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The Board’s conclusion “that the right enunciated in Weingarten applies
equally to represented and unrepresented employees”133 was based on the
Board’s opinion that the right to representation at investigatory meetings stems
not from Section 9 of the Act134 but from Section 7 rights which are not
dependent upon union organization.135 The Board reasoned that had the Court
intended to extend Weingarten rights to union represented employees only, the
Court’s decision would have been based on Section 9 of the Act.136 The
Materials Research Board ignored the fact that the Supreme Court had
specifically held that union employees were entitled to representation at
investigatory interviews.137 The use of the term “union representative” in the
Court’s Weingarten decision, the Materials Research Board reasoned, was
merely a result of the fact pattern presented in that case.138
The Materials Research Board further stated that the Court’s underlying
purpose in developing Weingarten rights was to put the employer and
employee on more equal footing.139 Even if the nonunion individual present at
the meeting does nothing more than act as a witness, the mere presence of a
coworker at the meeting advances that purpose of the Act.140 Indeed, the
Board reasoned that representation at an investigatory meeting may be more
important in the nonunion setting because those employees do not have access
to a grievance-arbitration procedure as do union represented employees.141

133. Id. at 1016.
134. The relevant portion of Section 9 states: “Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit.” 29 U.S.C. §
159(a) (1994).
135. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1012. The Board did recognize that in limited
instances, Section 7 rights have been curtailed based on an employee’s membership in a labor
organization. See Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (holding that union represented
employee’s attempt to deal with their employer directly thus circumventing the union was not
protected activity under the Act); N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 50 (1975)
(finding that the protections of Section 7 should extend to nonunion employees who walked off
the job due to substandard working conditions).
136. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1012 n.9. Section 9(a) gives the union the
exclusive right to bargain on behalf of its member. Thus, the Board stated that were Weingarten
rights a function solely of a union’s status as a collective-bargaining representative the rights
could be invoked by the union, regardless of the wishes of the employee. Such is not the case as
Weingarten rights may only be invoked by the employee facing the investigatory interview.
NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 257 (1975).
137. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1012.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1015. See also Judd, supra note 99, at 215.
140. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1012.
141. Id.
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To further support its position, the Board turned to its decision in Glomac
Plastics, Inc.,142 where it held, “Section 7 rights are enjoyed by all employees
and are in no way dependent on union representation for implementation.”143
The Board in Glomac found its position bolstered by Justices Powell and
Stewart’s dissenting opinion in Weingarten: “While the Court speaks only of
the right to insist on the presence of a union representative, it must be assumed
that the Section 7 right today recognized affording employees the right to act
‘in concert’ in employer interviews, also exists in the absence of a recognized
union.”144
Chairman Van De Water dissented in the Materials Research decision.145
In his view, Weingarten applied in only unionized settings where the employer
was obligated to deal with union representatives.146 In the absence of a union,
the employer is under no duty to deal with its employees over terms and
conditions of employment.147 Once the employees have elected a bargaining
representative, the employer is no longer permitted to deal with its employees
on an individual basis.148 Relying on the Board’s pre-Weingarten decision in
Texaco, Houston Producing Division,149 Van De Water noted the Texaco
Board’s determination that a collective bargaining relationship was an essential
element in the determination of an employee’s right to representation at
investigatory meetings.150
Although purporting to extend Weingarten rights to nonunion employees,
the Materials Research decision was nonetheless subject to varying
interpretations. In E.I. du Pont de Nemours (Du Pont I),151 the Board found
that E.I. du Pont, a nonunion company, had violated the Act by refusing to
allow a nonunion employee to have a witness present at a disciplinary
meeting.152 The Ninth Circuit thereafter refused enforcement of the Board’s

142. 234 N.L.R.B. 1309 (1978).
143. Id. at 1310.
144. Id. at 1311 (citing Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 270).
145. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1016.
146. John R. Van De Water, New Trends In N.L.R.B. Law, 33 LAB. L. J. 635 (1982). “In my
view, an employer cannot be compelled (absent certification or recognition) to recognize any
individual or group as a representative of its employees . . . . While the Board majority may feel
that nonunion employees need representatives, they ought not disrupt the statutory scheme to
achieve their view of equality.” Id. at 640.
147. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1016.
148. Id. at 1016-17.
149. See supra note 27.
150. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1017.
151. 262 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1982).
152. Id. at 1045 (1982). In this case, the employer docked an employee’s pay in response to
the employee’s unauthorized visit to his doctor. The following day the employer presented the
employee with a list of his work deficiencies and a document containing the conditions necessary
for his continued employment. The employee refused to sign the forms unless a coworker was
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order.153 The court stated that the Du Pont I case lacked any showing that the
employee in question was acting on behalf of other employees and was
therefore not acting in “concert for mutual aid and protection.”154 While
noting that unionization is not the only indicator of concertedness, the court
stated that there must be a showing that the requesting employee acts as part of
a group.155
2.

Sears Roebuck and DuPont II

Materials Research remained controlling for only three years. A change in
Board membership156 brought about the reversal of Materials Research with
the Board’s decision in Sears Roebuck.157 The Sears Board found erroneous
the Materials Research Board’s determination that Weingarten was decided
based solely on Section 7.158 The Board looked to its decision in Emporium
Capwell for guidance.159
In Emporium Capwell, the Supreme Court upheld the Board’s finding that
seven union-represented employees were legitimately discharged for picketing
their employer.160 Despite the fact that the employees were clearly engaged in
concerted activity, the Court found the employee’s conduct circumvented the
union in their efforts to deal directly with the company, which contravened the
exclusivity provisions of Section 9.161 Although the employees were engaged
in concerted activity that would have been protected by Section 7, even in the
absence of a union, the exercise of those rights could not act to displace “the
orderly collective-bargaining process contemplated by the NLRA.”162 As
such, the Sears Board reasoned that Section 7 rights can vary depending on an
present to act as a witness. The employer denied the employee’s request and subsequently
discharged him. Id.
153. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. N.L.R.B., 707 F.2d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 1983).
154. Id. at 1078. The Weingarten Court’s assumption of concertedness is supported by the
fact that a bargaining unit had been organized through concerted activity. As such, an employee’s
request for representation would be an extension of that concerted activity. Id.
155. Id. at 1079. See also Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984) (holding that for
an activity to be ‘concerted’ it must be engaged in with or on the authority of other employees,
not for one individual).
156. See Judd, supra note 99, at 216 n.52. The five members of the N.L.R.B. are appointed
by the President for staggered terms of five years. As a result, the make-up of the Board changes
on a yearly basis, often resulting in conflicting conclusions, as was the case here. See infra note
249 for further discussion regarding the appointment of Board members.
157. 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985).
158. Id. at 231.
159. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
160. Id. at 70.
161. Id. at 71-72. “Even assuming that [Title VII] protects employees’ picketing and
instituting a consumer boycott of their employer, the same conduct is not necessarily entitled to
affirmative protection from the NLRA.” Id. See also Flack, supra note 123, at 1052.
162. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 69.
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employee’s union status: “Section 7 rights of one group [of non-represented
employees] cannot be mechanically transplanted to the other group [of
represented employees] at the expense of important statutory policies.”163
The Sears Board also found fault with the Materials Research Board’s
argument that because a Weingarten representative has no authority to bargain
with the employer during an interview, the Weingarten principles easily extend
to nonunion employers.164 While such representatives have no authority to
bargain with the employer during the interview, the representative still
maintains the right to be heard at the meeting and make suggestions.165
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision in Weingarten found that a union
representative represents not only the employee being interviewed, but also all
other employees in the unit.166 Such a notion, the Sears Board ruled, does not
exist in nonunion settings and to hold otherwise would give nonunion
employees the benefit of union representation without the burden of certifying
a union. This, the Board stated, contravenes the Act’s exclusivity provision.167
Not long after the Sears decision, the Board’s decision in E.I. du Pont de
Nemours v. N.L.R.B. (Du Pont II) came before the Third Circuit.168 In Du Pont
II, an employee was discharged from a nonunion workplace for refusing to
attend an employer interview without a coworker present. After a lengthy
review process,169 the Board held that a nonunion employee does not have a
Section 7 right to the presence of a coworker in an investigatory interview.170

163. Sears, 274 N.L.R.B. at 231.
164. Id. at 231-32.
165. See Southwestern Bell, 251 N.L.R.B. 612 (1980). The Board affirmed an ALJ’s
determination that the Company had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it required the
union steward to remain silent during an investigatory interview. Id. at 620. See also supra note
31.
166. NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 260 (1975). Member Van De Water, in his
dissenting opinion in Materials Research, pointed out that a representative’s ability to speak and
offer alternative discipline constitutes “dealing with” the employer. Such dealings, Van De Water
suggested, are tantamount to a labor union’s status as the elected representative of the employees.
Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1016 n.30, 1019 n.40.
167. Sears, 274 N.L.R.B. at 232. Section 9 of the Act states that “[r]epresentatives designated
or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit.” 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994).
168. 724 F.2d 1061 (3rd Cir. 1983).
169. E.I. Du Pont (also known as Slaughter) was first decided in 1982. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours and Slaughter, 262 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1982). In that case, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s
determination that Du Pont had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging an employee
for refusing to submit to a management investigatory interview without the presence of another
employee as a witness. Id. at 1029. Du Pont filed a petition with the Third Circuit for review of
the Board’s decision, and the Board filed a cross-application for enforcement of its Decision and
Order. The Third Circuit panel enforced the Board’s Order. Du Pont II, 724 F.2d at 1063. Du
Pont filed a motion for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. Two weeks after Du Pont’s
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The Du Pont II Board reiterated the Supreme Court’s observation that the
question of whether an employee is entitled to representation at
employer/employee meetings in which discipline is the likely result involves
the “difficult task of ‘reconciling conflicting interests of labor and
management.’”171 In concluding that the Weingarten rights should not be
extended to unrepresented employees, the Du Pont II Board stated that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Weingarten did not comport to a nonunion
setting.172 The Board noted that Weingarten relied on the fact that
representation would safeguard not only the accused employee, but the entire
bargaining unit as well.173 In this regard, the Du Pont II Board found that a
coworker representative would have little, if any, of the same interests as a
union representative and would possess no duty to represent all similarly
situated employees.174

motion, the Board requested that the circuit court vacate its decision and remand the case back to
the Board for consideration. The Third Circuit granted the rehearing, vacated its previous opinion
and remanded the case back to the Board. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Chestnut Run) v.
N.L.R.B., 733 F.2d 296, 298 (3rd Cir. 1984).
After reviewing the record, as well as position statements filed by both parties, the Board
issued a supplemental Decision and Order reversing the ALJ’s findings and held that the
Company did not violate the Act when it terminated an employee for refusing to meet without
another employee present. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Slaughter, 274 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1985).
In so finding, the Board relied on its decision in Sears Roebuck which had been decided by the
time Du Pont II came to the Board. Sears, 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985). Specifically, the Du Pont
Board relied on the Sears Board’s determination that the Act compelled a finding that nonunion
employees are not entitled to union representation at investigatory interviews. Du Pont, 274
N.L.R.B. at 1104. The charging party filed a petition with the Third Circuit for review of the
Board’s supplemental Order. The court again remanded the case back to the Board, stating that
the Board’s reliance on the Sears mandate was erroneous. Specifically, the Board was wrong in
finding that the Act compels a finding that nonunion employees have no right to coworker
presence at disciplinary meetings. Slaughter v. N.L.R.B., 794 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1986). The
Board was directed to consider whether the Act precluded an alternative interpretation, for
instance, that nonrepresented employees are entitled to the assistance of a coworker at
investigatory meetings. Id. at 128.
On its third review, the Board held that the Act does not proscribe an interpretation that
nonunion employees are entitled to a coworker’s presence at employer/employee meetings where
discipline is at issue. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Slaughter, 289 N.L.R.B. 627, 628 n.8 (1988).
170. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours, 289 N.L.R.B. at 630-31.
171. Id. at 628 (quoting Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 267).
172. Id. at 629.
173. Id. at 628 (citing Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 261).
174. Id. at 629. The Board also noted that the coworker representative in a nonunion setting
would be less likely, if not completely unable, to vigorously represent an employee in the same
fashion as a union representative. Id. The union representative will usually have the benefit of an
established framework, namely a grievance and arbitration procedure, in which to work. Id. The
unrepresented coworker representative could act as nothing more than a witness and would have
little power to redress any concerns of the employees. Id. at 629-30.
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The Du Pont II Board recognized that in Weingarten the Supreme Court
held that union representatives at disciplinary interviews could also be a
benefit to the employer. It was the Court’s position that having a union
representative present would likely help the employer get to the root of the
problem more efficiently.175 Moreover, the union representative, while unable
to negotiate with the employer on behalf of the employee, can offer
suggestions or alternative disciplinary measures.176 Finding these factors
lacking in a nonunion shop, the Du Pont II Board refused to extend
Weingarten beyond a union setting.177
The Board also held that the employer’s ability to forego an interview
when an employee requests a representative’s presence weighed heavily in
favor of not extending Weingarten to a nonunion setting.178 Unlike a union
environment where the employer’s conduct could eventually be challenged
through the grievance procedure, a nonunion employee may likely lose his
only chance to tell his side of the story if the employer opts to forego the
interview.179
Du Pont II upheld the Sears Board’s determination that the interests of
labor and management were not served by the extension of Weingarten to
nonunion employees. In so holding, however, the Du Pont II Board
specifically rejected the Sears Board’s finding that its interpretation was the
only one permissible under the Act.180 While acknowledging that the statute
may be amenable to other interpretations, the Du Pont II Board refused to
revert to the findings of Materials Research.181

175. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 263.
176. Du Pont, 289 N.L.R.B. at 629-30.
177. Id. at 630. “Examining the foregoing considerations in a non-union setting, we conclude
that many of the useful objectives listed by the Court [in Weingarten] are much less likely to be
achieved or are irrelevant.” Specifically, the Board stated that a nonunion representative has no
obligation to represent the interests of the entire workgroup. Further, the Board noted that a
nonunion advocate would be much less versed in his role as an employee representative, thus
providing little benefit to either employee or employer. Id. at 629-30. See also Charles J. Morris,
N.L.R.B. Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General Theory of Section 7
Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1735 (1989).
178. Du Pont, 289 N.L.R.B. at 630.
179. Id. at 630.
180. Id. at 628 n.8. “In so concluding, we overrule the Board’s finding in Sears . . . that the
Act compels a finding that unrepresented employees are not entitled to the presence of a fellow
employee during an investigatory interview.” Id.
181. See supra notes 129-144 and accompanying text.
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III. IN RE EPILEPSY FOUNDATION
The Board’s recent ruling in In re Epilepsy Foundation tipped the scales in
favor of employees once again.182 In overruling Sears and DuPont II, the
Board reverted to its short-lived decision in Materials Research.183
A.

Epilepsy Foundation Facts

Employees Borgs and Hasan were employed with the Epilepsy Foundation
of Northeast Ohio in a school-to-work research program for teenagers with
epilepsy.184 On January 17, 1996, Borgs and Hasan sent a memo to Rick
Berger, their supervisor on the school-to-work project, stating that his
assistance was no longer needed.185 A copy of the memo was given to the
Foundation’s Executive Director, Christine Loehrke.186 On January 29, 1996,
upon learning of Loehrke’s displeasure with their memo, Borgs and Hasan
wrote another memo addressed to Loehrke, wherein they attempted to explain
the contentions made in the initial correspondence.187 This memo criticized
Berger’s contribution to the program and listed specific incidents where, in the
opinions of Borgs and Hasan, Berger had acted inappropriately.188
Two days later, Loehrke approached Borgs and instructed him to meet
with her and Berger.189 Borgs told Loehrke that he was not comfortable
meeting alone with Loehrke and Berger.190 Borgs asked if he could meet with
just Loehrke; she declined.191 He then asked if Hasan could be present at the

182. In re Epilepsy Foundation, Nos. 8-CA-28169 and 8-CA-28264, 2000 WL 967066
(N.L.R.B. Jul. 10, 2000).
183. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
184. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *1
185. Id. The memo read:
Mr. Jim Troxell and Dr. Bob Fraser have continued to provide supervisory input
pertaining to service delivery and the research component of the study. During the past
several months, Ms. Christine Loehrke has also provided input and assistance to the
NIDRR School-to-Work Project.
As mentioned during earlier discussions (albeit brief) with you, both Dr. Ashraful
Hasan and Mr. Arnis Borgs reiterate that your supervision of the program operations
performed by them is not required.
Your input to the NIDRR project in the past is appreciated. At this stage, the major
area which has to be addressed deals with outreach. Only support staff assistance is
needed in this regard.
Id. at *1 n.7.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *2.
190. Contributing also to his uneasiness was the fact that in 1995 Borgs had been interrogated
and disciplined for discussing salary information with other employees. Id. at *2 n.10.
191. Id.
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meeting; Loehrke again declined.192 When Borgs continued to refuse to meet,
he was discharged.193
Loehrke later wrote in Borgs’ subsequent termination letter that his refusal
to attend the meeting constituted gross insubordination.194
B.

The Discharge of Borgs195

The ALJ found that under the holding in DuPont II, the employer was
under no obligation to grant Borgs’ request that Hasan be present at the
meeting with Loehrke,196 and as such, the ALJ found that the Company’s
discharge of Borgs did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.197 Although the
Board acknowledged that the ALJ’s determination was correctly construed
from relevant Board precedent, the Board found the precedent to be
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s Weingarten decision, and with the
underlying purposes of the Act.198
The Board’s analysis started with an examination of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Weingarten.199 The Board specifically noted that the Court’s
decision found that an employee’s actions in seeking representation in
situations of employer investigatory interviews falls under the literal wording
of Section 7.200 Thus, an employee in such a situation has the right to “engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”201
Moreover, the Board noted the Court’s reasoning that representation at
investigatory interviews helps safeguard all employees against unjust
punishment.202 The Board found this notion, when coupled with the Court’s
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *2. The letter also made reference to the
January 17 memo, as well as to a “‘failure to build constructive work relationships with
management personnel,’” and a “‘resistance to accept responsibility for attempting to attain
articulated performance goals.’” The letter did not refer to these other acts as examples of gross
insubordination. Id. at *2 n.6.
195. Hasan was terminated a few months after Borgs for an incident unrelated to Borgs’
termination. This Note addresses only the discharge of Borgs and his request that Hasan be
present during the meeting with his supervisors.
196. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *2. While noting that unionized employees
enjoy the right to have a representative present at investigatory interviews, the Board noted that
the ALJ held, “under current Board precedent, employees in nonunionized workplaces do not
have the right to have a coworker present in similar circumstances.” Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. “After careful consideration, however, we find that precedent to be inconsistent with
the rationale articulated in the Supreme Court’s Weingarten decision, and with the purposes of
the Act.” Id.
199. Id.
200. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *2.
201. Id. See also supra note 6.
202. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *3.
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literal reading of the Act, illustrated that the right to representation is based on
a finding that the Act affords all employees the ability to band together to
address the imposition of unjust punishment.203
In finding that an employee’s right to representation is settled in Section 7,
the Board stated that the holdings in both Sears and DuPont II erroneously
limited the applicability of Weingarten to union represented employees.204 In
reverting to the Materials Research holding, the Board stated: “In our view,
the Board was correct in Materials Research to attach much significance to the
fact that the Court’s Weingarten decision found that the right was grounded in
the language of Section 7 of the Act, specifically the right to engage in
‘concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection.’”205 The
Board found this reasoning is equally applicable in circumstances where there
is no bargaining unit. It rationalized that a coworker’s presence during an
investigatory interview better equips the employees to act in concert to ensure
that the employer does not impose discipline unjustly.206
The Board in Epilepsy Foundation rejected the contention that their ruling
would “wreak havoc” with the provisions of the Act that guarantee nonunion
employers the right to deal individually with their employees.207 While it is
true that an employer is generally free to deal with nonrepresented employees
on an individual basis, the Board concluded that in doing so, an employer may
not interfere with an employee’s efforts to exercise their Section 7 rights.208
Dissenting Member Brame argued that extending Weingarten beyond the
union shop would essentially force employer’s to “deal with” what is in
essence a labor organization. The Epilepsy Foundation Board disagreed and
discounted the contention that allowing this would conflict with the exclusivity
principles of Section 9 of the Act.209 Ultimately, the Board stated that this
issue had been addressed by the Third Circuit in Slaughter v. N.L.R.B.210

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at *4. See also supra note 6.
206. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *4. The Board found its holding effectuates
the policy that “Section 7 rights are enjoyed by all employees and are in no wise [sic] dependent
on union representation for their implementation.” Id. at *4 (quoting Glomac Plastics, Inc., 234
N.L.R.B. 1309, 1311 (1978)).
207. Id at *4.
208. Id. (relying on Ontario Knife Co. v. N.L.R.B., 637 F.2d 840, 844-50 (2nd Cir. 1980)
(holding that while an employer is generally free to deal with employees on an individual basis in
the absence of a union, an employer may not interfere with the efforts of the employee to exercise
his Section 7 rights by asserting a right to deal with him on an individual basis)).
209. Id. See infra note 232 and accompanying text. See also supra note 134.
210. Slaughter v. N.L.R.B., 794 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1986). In Du Pont II, the Board rejected
the argument that ‘dealing with’ an employer is the equivalent of ‘bargaining with’ the employer.
Id. at 127 (1986). See supra note 169 for the DuPont II chronology.
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The Board noted that in Slaughter the court found misplaced the concerns
regarding the extension of Weingarten to nonunion settings being violative of
Section 9 of the Act.211 The Slaughter Board held that although the employee
had a right to the presence of a coworker at the interview, the employer had no
duty to bargain with the employee representative. In other words, the
employer must “deal with” the employee representative but has no duty to
“bargain with” the representative. As such, the fact that an employer must
merely “deal with” a representative cannot be a violation of Section 9, which
addresses only the issue of representation for the purpose of collective
bargaining.212
The Board also soundly rejected the DuPont II Board’s assertion that a
coworker in a nonunion setting has no obligation or incentive to represent the
interests of fellow employees and will likely not have the necessary skills with
which to adequately represent employees.213 The Board stated that such
contentions were speculative at best and ignored the fact that an employee may
opt to forego representation altogether when he or she believes that
representation will not be helpful.214 Further, Section 7 rights do not turn on
the abilities or on the motivations of the employee representatives and should
therefore not preclude employees from exercising these rights.215
Additionally, the Epilepsy Foundation Board found no merit in the Du
Pont II conclusion that extending these rights to nonunion employees may
cause these employees to lose their one and only opportunity to tell their side
of the story in that the employers can opt to forego the interview completely.216
Finding this scenario based “wholly on speculation,” the Board found no
reason to assume that employers would act purposefully to the detriment of the
employee.217 The Board again pointed out that the employee is not required to
request coworker representation and may therefore weigh his or her options of
doing so.218
Finally, the Board found unpersuasive the dissent’s concerns that the
Board’s ruling would place an “unknown trip wire” on employers who are
justifiably investigating employee conduct ignorant of the holding in

211. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *5 (citing Slaughter, 794 F.2d at 128).
212. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 259 (1975)).
213. Id. at 5. See supra notes 177 and accompanying text.
214. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *5.
215. Id. The Board stated that the import of Section 7 lies not with the sophistication of the
representation provided but with the fact that the employee was able to exercise his Section 7
rights in requesting that representation. Id. at *6 n.12.
216. Id. at *6. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
217. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *6. This begs the question that if the Board
firmly believes that the employer would not purposefully act to the detriment of the employee
then why would an employee need representation in an investigatory interview at all?
218. Id.
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Weingarten.219 In addressing this concern, the Board again stated that such a
contention is speculative and that regardless, an employer’s ignorance of an
employee’s rights cannot be a justification for denying those rights to the
employee.220
C. Dissenting Opinions
1.

Member Hurtgen

The dissenting opinions by Members Hurtgen and Brame took up where
Van De Water’s dissent in Materials Research left off.221 Member Hurtgen
stated that Section 7 of the Act protects an employee’s right to request
representation at an investigatory interview, but the Act does not require the
employer to grant the request.222 Phrasing the issue in Epilepsy Foundation as
whether federal law forbids a nonunion employer from dealing individually
with an employee during an interview with the employer, Member Hurtgen
argued this question had been answered in the negative in DuPont II.223
Relying on the Court’s rationale in Weingarten, that a union representative
safeguards the interests of the entire unit, Hurtgen found as implausible the
majority’s extension of this right to unrepresented employees:224 “[I]n a
nonunion setting, there is no ‘union representative’, and there is no ‘bargaining
unit.’ Thus, it is plain that the Court in Weingarten did not envisage rights to
representation in a nonunion setting.”225

219. Id.
220. Id. In reversing the trial examiner’s decision, the court went a step further and
retroactively applied its holding in Epilepsy Foundation. “We agree . . . that the Board should not
reverse important legal doctrine absent compelling considerations for doing so . . . . [W]e find
that such compelling considerations are present here because . . . the doctrine infringes upon the
exercise of Sec. 7 rights and is inconsistent both with Supreme Court precedent and the policies
of the Act.” Id. at *4 n.8. Dissenting Member Hurtgen disagreed characterizing the Board’s
imposition of retribution on an employer who acted in accordance with the rules in place at the
time “manifestly unjust.”
221. Id. at *12. See also supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text.
222. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *12.
223. Id. See supra notes 168-180.
224. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *13. The majority refuted Hurtgen’s
contention that the Court’s opinion in Weingarten speaks for itself in that it refers specifically to
“the union representative whose participation [the employee] seeks” in safeguarding the interests
of the “bargaining unit.” The majority held that the Court’s wording was representative of the
facts before the Court in Weingarten and should not be read to mean that Weingarten rights
extend only to unionized employees. Id. at *4 n.9.
225. Id. The difference between represented and unrepresented employees is unambiguous.
Unrepresented employees may be dealt with individually with regards to terms of employment
while employees represented by a union may not. The majority’s decision, Hurtgen argued,
eliminated this bright line. Id.
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Hurtgen found that the employer has the unequivocal right to weigh the
benefit of having a coworker present at an investigatory interview.226 If an
employer decides that the coworker’s presence will not help the interview
process, he is not legally obligated to grant the request.227 Likewise, an
employer has the unfettered right to dispense with the interview entirely. If
that determination is made, Hurtgen argued the government has no business
contradicting that decision.228 By doing so in Epilepsy Foundation, the Board
set forth an obstacle whereby “employers who are legitimately pursuing
investigations of employee conduct will face an unknown trip-wire . . . .”229
Further, because this evolution of the law will likely be unknown to most
nonunion employers, the resulting violations will likely result in a wealth of
litigation.230
2.

Member Brame

In the same vein, Member Brame argued that the majority’s interpretation
of the Act will alter the well-established relationship between management and
labor, a relationship that is grounded in the Board’s case history.231 He argued
that the majority’s interpretation extended representation rights to nonunion
employees who were not due such rights since no bargaining unit had been
elected by the employees.232 Such an interpretation of the Act is, in Brame’s
view, incorrect because the scope of Section 7 rights depends on the
employee’s union status.233
Reiterating Member Hurtgen’s dissenting opinion, Brame stated that
nonunion employees have the right to request, but not insist upon,
representation.234 Brame, however, went further to question the majority’s
rationale for allowing representation in this sole situation when no right of

226. Id. at *14.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *14.
230. Id. Hurtgen prolifically stated, “The workplace has become a garden of litigation and the
Board is adding another cause of action to flower therein, but hiding in the weeds.” Id. See also
Susan J. McGolrick, Employee Rights: Attorneys Disagree About Wisdom of N.L.R.B. Extending
Weingarten, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 152, at C-1 (Aug. 7, 2000) (stating that the extension of
these rights to nonunion employees is more of a concern for smaller employers who do have
regular legal counsel and could be “tripped up” not knowing they are violating the statute).
231. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *16. Brame, in a customarily lengthy
dissent, offers an extensive recitation of Board precedent on the issue of extending Weingarten
rights to nonunion employees. Id. at *16-19.
232. Id. at *16.
233. Id. See also supra notes 159-163.
234. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *28.
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representation attaches to meetings held to discuss other terms and conditions
of employment.235
The majority responded to this concern by stating that in Weingarten, the
Court addressed only the specific right of representation in investigatory
interviews.236 As such, other employment situations were not “encompassed
within the Weingarten rationale” and not before the Board.237 Brame asserted
that the majority avoided this issue because there is no rational reason to
extend Weingarten rights to nonunion employees for one type of meeting and
not another.238
Assuming, arguendo, that the majority’s interpretation was found to be a
permissible one, Brame posited that its holding is not the best alternative.239
Like Member Hurtgen, Member Brame placed significant reliance on the
effectiveness of coworker representation in the absence of a certified union.240
While a union representative can assist both the employer and the employee at
an investigatory interview, a coworker representative will not likely provide
much assistance.241 Brame attributes this to the fact that union representatives
are usually accustomed to attending fact-finding meetings and may, in some
cases, have formal training in advocacy, whereas a coworker representative
will likely have no experience at all.242
The majority discounted Hurtgen and Brame’s concerns regarding the
adequacy of representation by a coworker representative as being “wholly
speculative.”243 Brame countered this contention by alleging that “it seems
more speculative . . . to assume that a lone individual, selected on the spur of
the moment, will advance the interests of the unit.”244 Indeed, Brame points
out that under the majority’s holding an employee is free to choose any
coworker to act as a representative, including someone involved in the
dispute.245

235. Id.
236. Id. at *4 n.11.
237. Id. at *28 n.94. It is clear from Brame’s opinion that he views this response as an artful
dodge. “[The majority’s] argument does not even begin to answer the question posed.” Id.
238. Id. Van De Water noted as much when he observed that the Board’s holding in
Materials Research would not require the employer the grant an employee’s request for a
coworker’s presence when the employer wished to discuss such matters as pay or workings hours.
Id. at 23.
239. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *29.
240. Id. See also Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1021 (1982).
241. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *29.
242. Id.
243. Id. at *5.
244. Id.
245. Such was the case in Epilepsy Foundation, where employee Borgs requested the
presence of Hasan, the co-author of the letter for which the meeting was being called to discuss.
Id. at *2.
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In conclusion, Brame summarized his position by stating that the factors
relied upon to support the Court’s decision in Weingarten are not present in a
nonunion environment. As such, nonunion employers should not be burdened
with the presence of an employee representative that will add little, if anything,
to the process.246 Further, Brame maintained that “the NLRB [sic] itself
forbids this result” in that it burdens the nonunion employer with the
responsibility to “recognize a representative in a specific, limited, and
apparently arbitrary situation on an employer that is otherwise free to deal with
employees individually.”247
IV. WHERE THE BOARD WAS COMING FROM AND WHERE IT MAY BE GOING
The 1990s were a difficult time for the Board. High member turnover,
long vacancies and budget cuts resulted in enormous backlogs and delays in
decision-making.248 In total, there were fourteen members during the Clinton
Administration making up eight Clinton Boards.249 Added to the Board’s high
turnover rate is the fact that with the exception of eleven months between
November 1997 and December 1999, the Board did not function with five
confirmed members.250
A.

Overruling Precedent

The revolving door at the N.L.R.B. makes any attempt at analyzing the
Board’s decisional record onerous. One statistic more conspicuous than
others, however, is the fact that the Board overturned long-standing precedent
in twenty-three cases since Truesdale became Chairman in December 1998.251
Reversals are not new to the Board. Truesdale was quick to point out that the
Board’s record in 1998 was substantially lower than the Board’s all-time high
of forty reversals that occurred in 1984-85.252 Understandably, Truesdale’s
246. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *30.
247. Id.
248. See Wilma B. Liebman & Peter J. Hurtgen, The Clinton Board(s): A Partial Look From
Within, 16 LAB. LAW. 43, 44 (2000); see also Susan J. McGolrick, N.L.R.B.: Fox, Hurtgen
Discuss Board Turnover, Backlog, Changes in Modern Workplace, 1999 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 100, at C-1 (May 25, 1999).
249. National Labor Relations Board Members, available at www.nlrb.gov/members.html
(last visited Jan. 10, 2001). The full term of an N.L.R.B. member is five years. An individual
may be chosen mid-term, but only for the remainder of the predecessor’s remaining term. A
member may also serve a recess appointment holding membership on the Board only until the
end of the next session of the Senate. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1994). See also Liebman &
Hurtgen, supra note 248, at 43.
250. See Andrew M. Kramer, The Clinton Labor Board: Difficult Times For A Management
Representative, 16 LAB. LAW. 75, 75 (2000).
251. Susan J. McGolrick, Chairman Truesdale Plans to Keep Working Until Senate Confirms
New President’s Choice, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 222, at AA-1 (Nov. 16, 2000).
252. Id.
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record of twenty-three is a concern.253 Those who rely on the Board’s
interpretation of the Act to either administer daily labor relations or to
advocate for their clients who do, are left in a minefield of ever-changing
rules.254
The Board’s willingness to overturn longstanding rules seriously
undermines the credibility of the agency that is charged with proffering rules,
usually through adjudication rather than traditional rulemaking.255 The need
for reasoned opinions communicating clear standards is critical if the Board is
to be effective.256 Troubling, as well, is the fact that a number of cases have
resulted in split decisions.257 The Board’s failure to demonstrate a unified
front on several issues leaves the door open on those issues for future reversals,
or possibly judicial review.
While the general makeup of the Board can often be the cause of such an
occurrence, such a convenient justification does not seem as likely, given the
Board’s membership at the time.258 Indeed, the Truesdale Board, which was

253. Rep. John Boehner (R-Ohio) said as much at a hearing to discuss recent decisions by the
N.L.R.B.: “One cannot look at the Board’s increasing tendency to ignore long-standing labor law
and fail to be concerned.” See Susan McGolrick, House Subcommittee Chair Questions Board
Decisions Overturning Precedent, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 183, at A-9 (Sept. 20, 2000).
254. What seems even more troubling is the Board’s inclination to impose these new rules
retroactively, as was the case in Epilepsy Foundation. See supra note 220.
255. See
National
Labor
Relations
Board
Publications,
available
at
www.nlrb.gov/publications/first60yrs_entirepub.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2001).
256. See, Kramer supra note 250, at 100.
257. See, e.g., Jefferson Smurfit, 331 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (2000) (Members Fox, Hurtgen, Brame
participating, Member Fox dissenting) (holding that an employer has no obligation to accept a
card count as proof of majority status, unless there is a clear agreement between the parties to do
so); SOS Staffing Services, 331 N.L.R.B. No. 97 (2000) (Members Fox, Hurtgen, Brame
participating, Member Hurtgen dissenting) (ruling that the employer violated the Act by
threatening not to hire union members and terminating a union organizer); Hacienda Hotel, Inc.
Gaming Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (2000) (Chairman Truesdale, Members Fox, Liebman,
Hurtgen, Brame participating, Members Fox and Liebman dissenting) (holding that the employer
did not violate the Act when it unilaterally ceased checking off union dues after the expiration of
the collective bargaining agreement); Lockheed Martin Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (2000)
(Members Hurtgen, Brame, Liebman participating, Member Liebman dissenting) (overruling the
union’s objections to the employer’s use of e-mails in a decertification election the union lost);
Family Services Agency, 331 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (2000) (Chairman Truesdale, Hurtgen, Brame,
Fox, Liebman participating, Chairman Truesdale dissenting) (finding that the potential for undue
influence that exists with an employer’s use of a supervisor as an election observer does not arise
when the supervisor serves as an observer for the union).
258. One might assume that the vast amount of reversals occurred during Gould’s tumultuous
chairmanship. Such was not the case. See generally, Joan Flynn, “Expertness for what?”: The
Gould Years at the N.L.R.B. and the Irrepressible Myth of the “Independent” Agency, 52 ADMIN.
L. REV. 465 (2000). But see Charles B. Craver, The Clinton Labor Board: Continuing A
Tradition Of Moderation And Excellence, 16 LAB. LAW. 123, 124 (2000) (suggesting that Gould
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touted as the “most balanced Board in years,”259 was comprised of two former
union attorneys, two former management attorneys, and a long-time N.L.R.B.
professional.260 Despite the lack of obvious motive, several may nonetheless
be adduced.
1.

Declining Union Membership

Although the number of employees represented by unions remained
relatively constant in 1999 at 16.5 million (up from 16.2 million the year
before),261 there is no question that union membership as a percentage of the
number of workers has drastically declined. In 1946, 14,322,000 workers were
members of labor unions; by 1956, this number had exceeded 17,000,000.262
This represented 35% of the workforce in both 1946 and 1956.263 In the
1960s, labor unions’ growth started to slow. Many large industries that were
traditionally unionized were no longer expanding or were relocating their
facilities to non-union states.264 By 1999, private sector unions represented
only 9.4% of employees.265

was neither a radical union supporter nor management supporter, but rather an “unequivocal
supporter of employee rights.”).
259. See Rick Valliere, N.L.R.B.: N.L.R.B. Has the Balance Required For Deciding
Emerging Workplace Issues, Panel Agrees, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 05 at C-1 (Jan. 7,
2000).
260. Member Peter J. Hurtgen and J. Robert Brame came to the Board after careers as
management advocates. Members Sarah M. Fox and Wilma B. Liebman were former union
attorneys. Chairman John Truesdale has spent a majority of his career with the N.L.R.B. This
balanced representation, in and of itself, is a marked change in that Board members are usually
cut from two cloths, labor lawyers from management practices and government careerists. See
Flynn, supra note 258, at 471. Of the twenty-six Board members appointed since 1970, eleven
came from labor law private practice on the management side with twelve coming from career
government employment. Id. at 471 n.28. Only Member Margaret Browning, who served from
1994 until her death in 1997, was appointed to the Board directly from union-side practice. Id. at
471 n.30. See also N.L.R.B.: Member Margaret A. Browning Dies of Cancer at Age 46, 1997
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 41 at A-10 (Mar. 3, 1997). Betty Murphy, appointed in 1975, had an
unusual background with a firm that represented international unions as well as management
clients. Members Sarah Fox and Wilma Liebman, as previously stated, spent much of their
careers as union lawyers but were working in the public sector at the time of their appointments.
Id.
261. See Daniel J. Roy, Unions: Number of Union Members Rose Slightly in 1999, but
Percentage Remained Constant, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 13 at AA-1 (Jan. 20, 2000).
262. See also Charles B. Craver, Mandatory Worker Participation is Required in a Declining
Union Environment to Provide Employees With Meaningful Industrial Democracy, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 135, 136-37 (1997).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 137 (noting that many companies were migrating from the Snow Belt states to the
Sun Belt areas of the South and Southwest).
265. See Roy, supra note 261.
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While shrinking union percentages can be attributed to several things, the
most notable is the shift in the workforce from blue to white collar.266 The
new global economy, which is powered by technology, is not as conducive to
collective bargaining as were the traditional, labor-intensive manufacturing and
production industries.267 Modern employees are highly trained and highly
skilled and not as inclined to become union members.268 In addition, many
employers are providing personnel rules and human resource policies similar
to those found in unionized environments, thus reducing further the desire of
employees to join labor unions.
Market trends and employment practices are evolving significantly faster
than labor laws.269 Employers are experimenting with new workplace concepts
such as telecommuting and flexible schedules. These are concepts that the
framers of the Act could not have fathomed. This changing work environment
may have contributed, in part, to the Board’s decision to uproot existing labor
policies in several decisions.
In Boston Medical Center. Corp.,270 the Board reversed a twenty-threeyear precedent to hold that interns and residents at the Medical Center
constituted covered “employees” rather than unprotected “students.”271 The
Board stated that changes in health care have made interns and residents a
more critical component of providing health care in hospitals.272 While vast
changes in the medical field cannot be denied, Hurtgen’s dissenting opinion

266. Jim Barlow, Blue Collars Fading to White, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 8, 1992, at 1.
By the year 2010, it is estimated that only 10%, and possibly as little as 5%, of the workforce will
be blue collar.
267. See Liebman & Hurtgen, supra note 248, at 46.
268. Id. See also Barlow, supra note 266 (stating: “[W]orker’s don’t cotton to union
contracts, which reward everyone in a particular job with the same salary and raises, regardless of
individual effort.”).
269. See Susan J. McGolrick, Chairman Truesdale Plans to Keep Working Until Senate
Confirms New President’s Choice, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 222, at AA-1 (Nov. 16,
2000) (noting Member Fox’s statement that in all but a few cases where precedent was overruled
the Board was presented with new issues and developments). See also Liebman & Hurtgen,
supra note 248, at 47 (stating that traditional notion of labor “no longer fits many of the
employment relationships of the 21st century.”).
270. 330 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (1999). The majority consisted of Chairman Truesdale and
Members Liebman and Fox. Hurtgen and Brame dissented.
271. This decision has the potential to affect some 90,000 individuals who worked for private
hospitals. See Michelle Amber, Health Care Employees: N.L.R.B. Rules That Interns and
Residents at Boston Medical Center are Employees, 1999 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 229 at AA1 (Nov. 30, 1999).
272. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 30 at *15. The Board noting that 80% of
intern’s time is spent caring for patients. The fact that residents and intern learn on the job does
not exempt them from the Act’s definition of “employee.”
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noted that the only thing that has changed with regards to the status of interns
and residents is the make-up of the Board.273
Similarly, the Board expanded the definition of employee in New York
University.274 In this case, a unanimous Board275 overturned its previous
holdings that graduate assistants were considered students and are therefore
exempt under Section 2(3) of the Act.276 The Board’s holding makes New
York University the first private university in the United States to have unionrepresented teaching assistants.277
In M.B. Sturgis, Inc., the Board held that employees obtained from a labor
supplier, (such as a temporary employment service), may be included in the
same bargaining unit as the permanent employees of the employer to which
they are assigned, without the consent of the employers.278 In so holding, the
Board overruled its 1990 decision in Lee Hospital279 in which it held that
bargaining units that include both regular employees and temporary workers

273. Id. at *30. Hurtgen condemned the majority’s decision, stating that an agency has the
power to change its rules and policies only if there are changes in circumstances. See In re
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968). See also N.L.R.B. v. Majestic
Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966).
274. New York University, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (2000).
275. Chairman Truesdale and Members Liebman and Hurtgen took part in this decision.
Hurtgen, who dissented in Boston Medical, distinguished the graduate teaching assistants from
hospital residents and interns by noting that unlike graduate assistants, the work performed by
medical residents and interns is a “necessary and fundamental part of their education.” New York
University, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 111, at *8. See also, Susan J. McGolrick, Representation
Elections: N.L.R.B. Adopts Regional Director’s Ruling That NYU Graduate Assistants May
Organize, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 213 at AA-1 (Nov. 2, 2000).
276. New York University, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 11, at *3. Section 2(3) states in relevant part:
“The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee . . . [unless the Act explicitly states
otherwise] . . . but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or
spouse, or any individual employed as an independent contractor . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1994).
The New York University Board held that ample evidence existed to find that graduate assistants
plainly and literally fall within the meaning of “employee” as defined in Section 2(3).
277. See Susan J. McGolrick, Representation Elections: N.L.R.B. Adopts Regional Director’s
Ruling That NYU Graduate Assistants May Organize, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 213 at
AA-1 (Nov. 2, 2000).
278. 331 N.L.R.B. No. 173 (2000). The majority was comprised of Chairman Truesdale and
Members Fox and Liebman. Brame was the lone dissenter with Hurtgen recusing himself from
this case. See Susan J. McGolrick, Contingent Workers: N.L.R.B. 3-1 Allows Certain Bargaining
Units Including Both Temporary, Regular Workers, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 170 at AA1 (Aug. 31, 2000).
279. Nos. 14-RC-11572 and 9-UC-406, 2000 WL 1274024 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 25, 2000).
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are multiemployer bargaining units and require the consent of the
employers.280
In all three of the aforementioned cases, employee’s rights to organize
were significantly expanded. This sudden expansion has left many
commentators perplexed, if not hostile.281 Union expansion may not be the
only concern being addressed by the Board.
2.

An Unresponsive Legislature

The Board’s sudden propensity for disregarding its own precedent may
also be in response to federal and state legislatures’ failure to enact measures
safeguarding employee’s rights. The first such proposal was the Model
Employment Termination Act (META) of 1991.282 Drafted by Uniform Law
Commissioners, META was designed to protect workers from arbitrary
discharge by amending the “at will” doctrine to require discharge only for just
cause.283 The measure, which provides a definition of just cause284 and
mandates the use of arbitration for disputes,285 has not been adopted by any
state.286

280. In his dissent, Brame argued that such bargaining units constitute multiemployer units
under Section 9(b) of the Act in that although these employees are all performing work for the
same employer, they do not have the same employer. Id. at *32.
281. See Perkins Coie, N.L.R.B. Goes On Rampage Against It’s Own Precedent, 6 OR.
EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER, 7 (2000) (“Because the composition of the N.L.R.B. changes with the
incumbent administration, reversals of precedent are not uncommon. Those cases illustrate the
perspective of the current Board majority and how it is willing to change the rules to help unions
organize. The bottom line: beware. The rules are subject to change, and the only thing that is
certain is that they are likely to change in favor of unions rather than you.”). See also generally
Kramer, supra note 250.
282. See The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, available at
www.nccusl.org/uniformact_summaries/uniformacts-s-meta.htm (last visited January 12, 2001).
283. See Wrongful Discharge: Adoption of Model Termination Act ‘Win-Win’ Proposition,
A.C.L.U. Director Says, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 20 at D-12 (Jan. 31, 1995) (stating that
META would guarantee minimum rights against wrongful discharge while reducing potential
liability for employers). For a history of the At-Will Doctrine see Jeanne Duquette Gorr, The
Model Employment Termination Act: Fruitful Seed or Noxious Weed?, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 111, 112
(1992); see also Dawn S. Perry, Deterring Egregious Violations Of Public Policy: A Proposed
Amendment To The Model Employment Termination Act, 66 WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992).
284. “Good cause” is defined in META as one of two things: one, the employee’s inadequate
or improper conduct in the performance of the job; and two, if economic or institutional goals of
the employer mandate a reduction in force. See supra note 282.
285. Id. See also Perry, supra note 283, at 922-23.
286. See Perry, supra note 283, at 915 n.4 (noting that while not adopting META, Montana
became the first and only state to legislatively prohibit wrongful discharge).
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Another legislative initiative that was met with resistance was the
Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act (TEAM) of 1997,287 which would
have amended Section 8(a)(2) of the Act.288 The proposal would have given
employers the ability to establish what labor opponents termed labormanagement cooperative programs and what labor advocates viewed as
company-dominated labor unions.289
President Clinton vetoed the bill,290 saying that “rather than promoting
genuine teamwork, [the bill] would undermine the system of collective
bargaining that has served this country so well for many decades.”291 Clinton
noted that today’s labor laws allow for cooperative workplace initiatives such
as the creation of quality circles, work teams and programs designed to solicit
employee suggestions and criticisms regarding a variety of workplace
issues.292
The failure of any state to pass META, and the Presidential veto of the
TEAM Act may serve to reinforce the conviction that if nonunion workers are
to be protected, the responsibility to do so lies with the Board.293 Such a
notion may perhaps explain the expansions of the Act promulgated by the
Board.
B.

The Implications of Epilepsy Foundation
1.

Who, What, When and Why?

In deciding to extend Weingarten beyond the union sector, the Epilepsy
Board left many questions unanswered, including who is entitled to this added
protection. The Board held that any employee fearful that a meeting with
management will likely result in discipline may request a coworker’s presence.
What about a meeting to discuss absenteeism when the employee is not subject
287. See Employee Participation, Senate Panel Hears From Labor, Business On Passage of
TEAM Act, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30 at E-1 (Feb. 13, 1997); S. 295, 104th Cong.
(1996).
288. Section 8(a)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to “dominate or
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1994).
289. See Clinton Vetoes TEAM Act Despite Please For Passage, 152 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)
417 at D-19 (Aug. 5 1996).
290. H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 295, 105th Cong. (1997).
291. Id. The legislation had narrowly passed the House by a vote of 221-202 and by 53-43 in
the Senate. This narrow margin of support was insufficient to override President Clinton’s veto.
Id.
292. Id. Clinton also recognized that 96% of all large employers have employee involvement
teams. Id. See also Craver, supra note 262, at 142.
293. See Morris, supra note 177, at 1676 (contending that because so many more nonunion
companies exist today compared to union companies, the Board’s presence is more important to
nonunion establishments and their employees than ever before).
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to discipline at that time but may be in the future if the problem persists?
Consider also a meeting to discuss a mediocre job evaluation where the
employee is not going to be disciplined at that time but may be subject to
disciplinary action down the line. Would these employees be within their
statutory rights to refuse to meet with the employer without a coworker
present?
The Board’s failure to state how an employee representative is to be
chosen implies that the employee is free to choose whomever they want.294
How does an employer protect the privacy of the alleged victim and alleged
harasser if one or the other demands a coworker’s presence in the meeting?
How is an employer to handle situations such as sexual harassment where it
may be the employer’s desire to interview employees separately to avoid
collusion?295 Under Title VII, the employer can be held liable for not
addressing a sexual harassment complaint,296 but under Epilepsy Foundation,
the employer may be precluded from taking the necessary steps to remedy the
problem because it cannot discover all the facts.
Other questions seemingly left open concern employer obligations. For
example, is an employer required to grant paid time off to employees acting as
employee representatives?297 Should an employer have a policy for notifying
their employees about these newfound rights?298 What are the employer’s
obligations with regards to notifying the employee in advance that the meeting
may lead to disciplinary action? Do employer’s have an obligation to

294. See Susan J. McGolrick, Employee Rights: Attorneys Disagree About Wisdom of
N.L.R.B. Extending Weingarten, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 152, at C-1 (Aug. 7, 2000)
(assuming that extending Weingarten rights to nonunion employees also means extending the
same limitations. For example, employees do not have the right to insist on a coworker
representative who is not present at work at the time of the meeting, they cannot bring in an
attorney or any other non-employee as a representative). See also supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
295. McGolrick, supra note 294, at C-1.
296. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998) (noting that an employer may
be liable for the existence of a hostile sexual work environment caused by another employee).
297. See Torzewski, supra note 46. The author, analyzing the dissenting opinions in
Weingarten, notes many of these same concerns. For instance, noting that Justices Powell and
Stewart’s position that the majority’s opinion would undoubtedly extend to nonunion settings, the
author propounded a concern as to how a representative would be selected by a nonunion
employee seeking representation. Employers, the author contended, would likely be required to
provide new rules governing an employee’s ability to leave his job area in order to provide
employee representation. Id. at 324.
298. At this time there is no requirement that employers notify their employees of their
Weingarten rights. See supra note 294 and accompanying text. See also ROBERT M. SCHWARTZ,
THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF UNION STEWARDS 79-80 (1994) “Employers have no obligations to
inform employees of their rights to union representation. This is the union’s job.” But see
McGolrick, supra note 294 (encouraging employers to notify employees of these new rights
through employee handbooks or meetings as a sign of good faith on the part of the employer).
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“Weingartenize” employees prior to an investigatory meeting? These
questions will likely remain unanswered until the Board is presented with these
issues.
2.

The Board’s Case Load—Here We Go Again

The failure to delineate clear guidelines in Epilepsy Foundation governing
these types of situations will necessitate a case-by-case handling of these
issues, likely resulting in future challenges reaching the Board. One must
question the prudence of the Board making decisions that expand their
jurisdiction even further.
“As the Board moves into 21st century, it is still trying to finish the work
of the 20th century.”299 The N.L.R.B.’s backlog reached its pinnacle in 1984
when the Board had 1647 cases awaiting review.300 As of February 1999 that
number had dropped to 733 with many cases waiting over two years to be
heard.301 Member Hurtgen noted that ideally all cases should be decided
within one year, barring excessively lengthy records.302
As an agency of limited means with a large pending backlog, it seems that
the Board may be spreading itself even thinner. A valid argument may be
made that the lack of Board resources does not justify denying employees their
rights under the Act. It may also be argued, however, that the Board
overturning long-standing precedent that results in the expansion of the
Board’s jurisdiction is unjust to the employees, the unions and the employers
involved in the 700 cases awaiting attention by the Board.
V. CONCLUSION
The Epilepsy Foundation decision has the potential to extend traditional,
albeit limited, union type coverage to millions of employees who have not
certified a labor organization. While there is no question that Section 7 of the
Act safeguards an employee’s right to act in concert for mutual aid and
protection, the analysis does not stop there for nonunion employees.
If these employees wish to be afforded the benefits of unionism, they may
do so by certifying a union. In the absence of a union, the employer is free to
deal with employees on an individual basis. These bright-line rules should not
299. Susan McGolrick, N.L.R.B.: Fox, Hurtgen Discuss Board Turnover, Backlog, Changes
in Modern Workplace, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at C-1 (May 25, 1999).
300. John C. Truesdale, Battling Case Backlogs at the N.L.R.B.: The Continuing Problem of
Delays In Decision Making and the Clinton Board’s Response, 16 LAB. LAW. 1 (2000).
301. Id. at 2. An audit conducted by the executive secretary in March 1999 revealed that 74
representation cases had been pending for over two years and 72 unfair labor practice cases would
be three years old by the end of 1999.
302. See. e.g., Avondale Indus., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (1999). Avondale’s hearing transcript
was more than 40,000 pages long, with an ALJ decision comprised of 650 pages. Truesdale,
supra note 300, at 3.
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be clouded by the Board’s extension of a traditional union right to nonunion
employees. By doing so, the Board has unquestionably opened a Pandora’s
box of arguments that other rights historically enjoyed by union members
exclusively should now be extended to nonunion employees.
While it is likely that the Sixth Circuit will uphold the Epilepsy
Foundation decision as a permissible interpretation of the Act,303 the wisdom
of doing so should be considered. Whether intentionally or not, the Board has
spread its protective mantle over an enlarged population and the likely result
will be an increased caseload addressing not only violations of the Epilepsy
Foundation decision, but also numerous issues left unanswered by the Epilepsy
Board. At a time when the Board is coming to grips with its case backlog, it
seems ill-advised for the Board to take on more than it can handle.
In its sixty-fifth year, the Board has its hands full trying to apply the Act to
the workplace of the new millennium. While overturning precedent may be
necessary, the Board’s penchant for reversing long-standing authority weakens
their reputation as a cohesive agency expert in the area of labor law. This begs
the question as to what extent the Board should be given deference by courts.
When the only thing constant at the Board is change, both management and
labor will find little guidance from Board rulings and feel little comfort relying
on what may become known as “decisions de jour.”
LADAWN L. OSTMANN*

303. Reversal on appeal may be unlikely since the Board’s decision will likely be found to
have drawn its essence from the Act.
*
J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University School of Law, 2002; M.S.I.R., Loyola University of
Chicago, Institute of Human Resources and Industrial Relations, 1997; B.S.B.A., Lindenwood
College, 1990. This Note is dedicated to Douglas Bobillo and Irene Mullenschlader, mentors and
friends.
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